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Queer Phenomenology in Law: A Critical
Theory of Orientation
Nick J. Sciullo*

Introduction
This Article argues for the application of phenomenology to
legal understanding, specifically as a way to think about and
through queer people’s interactions with law as well as queer
theory in law. There are both pragmatic and theoretical
justifications for this project. The pragmatic justifications
include the need to better address the legal issues and
experiences of queer people, recent political and legal decisions
and debates that affect queer people specifically, the need to
better provide epistemological resources for queer lawyers, law
scholars, law students, and their allies, and the need to better
understand how law affects minoritarian populations regardless
of specific identity characteristics. The theoretical justifications
include the relative under-theorization of queer theory in law,
the improvement of legal theory’s interaction with related
theories in the humanities and social sciences, and the
development of a more robust theory of everyday interactions
with law consistent with individuals’ diverse experiences and
identities. These justifications counsel for further study and
attempts to account for diversity in law.
The first part of this Article1 discusses phenomenology
historically and theoretically, applying the insights of important
continental philosophy scholars as well as modern day theorists
from law, communication, women’s studies, cultural studies,
Assistant Professor of Communications, Texas A&M University-Kingsville.
Postgraduate Certificate, University of Central Florida; Ph.D., Georgia State
University; J.D., West Virginia University College of Law; M.S., Troy
University; B.A., University of Richmond. A shorter version of this Article was
presented at a talk at Southern Illinois University School of Law on April 12,
2018 sponsored by SIU Law OUTLaw. Thanks to Erin Hogdson (Southern
Illinois University School of Law, Class of 2020) who made that talk possible.
1. See infra notes 6–52.
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queer studies, and related disciplines.
The second part of this Article2 discusses Sara Ahmed’s
theories of orientation and disorientation. Firmly rooted in the
writings of Edmund Husserl, Ahmed’s theories are a way to both
think about political possibility and the ways in which rights,
identity, and action are all inhibited and empowered by
disorientation. While scholars in many disciplines have applied
these ideas to everything from academia to law, and
communication to gender studies, legal scholarship on these
ideas has been slim. This section considers (dis)orientation an
everyday event impacted at every turn, from using the bathroom
to appearing in court.
The third part of this Article3 discusses the difficulties of
orientation and disorientation in law specifically. Although law
is only one part of the broader social milieu, it affects us in
seemingly innumerable ways. This section discusses the way
law inhibits and enables various orientations and offers fruitful
paths to (re)orient oneself in law.
The fourth part of this Article4 proposes Sara Ahmed’s
theory of hammering as a strategy for challenging
heteronormative legal theory and practice as well as, by
extension, other normative practices that can limit participation
and advancement of minoritarians in law and society.
Hammering’s applicability to issues complex (court cases, social
movements, etc.) and less so (colleagues’ inappropriate language
use, general confusion about queerness, etc.) makes it a fruitful
praxis for challenging oppressive systems in law and elsewhere.
The conclusion5 emphasizes the importance of the body as a
site of theorizing law. Absent the body, law risks material harm
not only to queer people, but to other minoritarians who may be
commodified and objectified through both overt discrimination
as well as more subtle forms of ignoring and misperceiving.
Without the body, law fails to inform a functioning society and
assure protection for people under its jurisdiction.

2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra notes 53–68.
See infra notes 69–97.
See infra notes 98–130.
See infra notes 131–143.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/4

2

ARTICLE 4_SCIULLO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

QUEER PHENOMENOLOGY IN LAW

8/23/2019 6:33 PM

669

On Phenomenology
Phenomenology is a not-so-old philosophical tradition
concerned with what can be experienced.6 It is concerned not
only with this ephemeral notion of experience, but also with
living, knowing, and perceiving.7 Central to phenomenology is
the idea of indeterminacy, which phenomenology scholars argue
we must embrace to better understand how we think, act, and
live in the world.8 As such, phenomenology is uniquely able to
advance a queer theory of law that centers the complexity of
gender and sexual orientation in the uniquely orienting world of
law. That is, embracing fluidity, difference, and indeterminacy
are necessary preconditions for a theory of any difference in law
such that it does not recreate normative preferences for who or
what is powerful.
Phenomenology was, in large part, a reaction to the focus on
metaphysical questions that seemed to err toward the
ephemeral.9 There was a sense that philosophy failed to
6. See generally EDMUND HUSSERL, THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY (Lee
Hardy trans., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1st ed. 1999) (1952).
7. Mark P. Orbe, Assessing the Civil Rights Health of Communities:
Engaged Scholarship Through Dialogue, in 1 COMMUNICATION ACTIVISM 133,
133, 142 (Lawrence R. Frey & Kevin M. Carragee eds., 2007).
8. Silvia Stroller best made this argument when she wrote: “In his
phenomenology, Husserl introduced a positive conception of what is
indeterminate in the experience of the world. This positive conceptualization
of indeterminacy was more clearly articulated by the French phenomenologist
Maurice Merleau-Ponty who in his Phenomenology of Perception claimed: ‘We
must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon.’” Silvia Stroller,
The Indeterminable Gender: Ethics in Feminist Phenomenology and
Poststructuralist Feminism, 13 JANUS HEAD, no 1, 2013, at 17, 23 (quoting
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 7 (Colin Smith
trans., Routledge Classics 2002) (1945)). For Merleau-Ponty, this means
recognizing the indeterminate as indeterminate and not just as the negation
of something else. This reorientation is essential. What Merleau-Ponty calls
for is a rehabilitation of the indeterminate in our thinking. “In my opinion this
rehabilitation of the indeterminate is a challenge we are still facing since it is
still difficult, personally and philosophically, to allow the indeterminate to
remain indeterminate and to accept indeterminacy as such.” Id.
9. Emiliano Trizio describes Edmund Husserl’s reaction this way: “We
have enough elements to draw some conclusions concerning Husserl’s notion
of metaphysics before the so-called transcendental turn. Husserl’s thought
was motivated from the outset by the project of developing a philosophy
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adequately account for people’s experiences, that is, how they
experienced philosophy as lived or, put differently, how
philosophy translated into politics.10
Now, criticisms of
philosophy and theory courses in the humanities11 as well as of
the theory courses that are increasingly absent in law school
curricula are prominent.12 This suggests that phenomenology
may be a way to incorporate theory into law school in a way that
supports a material understanding of legal practice.
Phenomenology benefits law because it blows the dust off of
the covers of hornbooks, county plat maps, and leather covered
legal pads. Law is fundamentally about people—people who
experience the world in vastly different ways and for whom legal
systems often poorly guarantee rights and basic respect.
Phenomenology asks people to return to the body as a site of
creation and contestation.
As Sara Ahmed puts it:
“[P]henomenology attends to the tactile, vestibular, kinaesthetic
[sic] and visual character of embodied reality.”13 It asks us to
corresponding to the highest ambitions of the European tradition. In this
programmatic framework, metaphysics presents itself as the crowning
discipline, the one dealing with the fundamental questions concerning the
totality of the real being of the world and of anything that might lie ‘beyond it.’
Within this approach, Husserl does not appear to be preoccupied by the
complex historical evolution of the concept of metaphysics from Aristotle’s
characterization up to its Kantian and post-Kantian developments. Rather, as
is typical of his method, he appropriates a motive from the tradition and
elaborates it in light of the theoretical developments and the resulting
constraints characterizing his philosophical situation.” Emiliano Trizio,
Husserl’s Early Concept of Metaphysics as the Ultimate Science of Reality,
PHAINOMENON Oct. 2017, at 37, 63–64 (2017).
10. See Max Horkheimer, The Social Function of Philosophy, RADICAL
PHIL., WINTER 1972, AT 10, 10–13.
11. Id.
12. David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/afterlaw-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html; see also Jeff Schmitt &
Tipping The Scales, Here’s How Law School Grads Would Fix Law School,
FORTUNE (July 26, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/26/heres-how-law-schoolgrads-would-fix-law-school/. See generally, William T. Vukowich, Comment,
The Lack of Practical Training in Law Schools: Criticisms, Causes and
Programs for Change, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 140, 140–52 (1971) (arguing for
more practical training of law students).
13. Sara Ahmed, A Phenomenology of Whiteness, 8 FEMINIST THEORY 149,
153 (2007).
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measure our philosophical knowledge against the lived world.
There are several reasons why this portends opportunity for law.
First, phenomenology orients legal thinkers and
practitioners toward facts so that they remember why they are
lawyers, judges, social workers, activists, and scholars. Facts
matter in law; they were often a focus in early law school classes.
Sometimes they seem obscured by theory or the parsing of
precedent. Theory should not obscure facts, but rather should
emphasize them because the material conditions of life demand
theorization as much as the immaterial.14 This is not to argue
for a material theorization of law that focuses solely on material
conditions,15 but rather to argue from a materialist legal theory
that appreciates the immaterial and material conditions of life
at once—a materialism where facts matter to law and theory. 16
One of the troubled framings of law that many people take
up is the ethereal language of rights and liberties,17 denying the
impact these struggles have for people and preventing an
application to lives and lived experience.
Grand rights
discourses often discuss people as afterthoughts.18 It would be
14. Allison Assiter describes materialism as being fundamentally
concerned with people’s lives (“Before justifying Marx’s materialism in this
way I must begin describing it. The subject material of Marx’s materialist
conception of history is material life. What is this? An answer is: ‘{People],
their activity, and the material conditions under which they live.’”). Alison
Assiter, Philosophical Materialism or the Materialist Conception of History,
RADICAL PHIL. Winter 1979 at 12, 16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See
generally Bertrand Russell, Introduction to FRIEDRICH ALBERT LANGE, THE
HISTORY OF MATERIALISM, AND CRITICISM OF ITS PRESENT IMPORTANCE v–xix (3d
ed. 1925) (1881) (discussing the development of materialism in philosophy with
an emphasis on the physical sciences).
15. Norman Levine, The German Historical School of Law and the
Origins of Historical Materialism, 48 J. HIST. IDEAS 431, 437–45 (1987).
16. A project like this would follow the work of Ronald W. Greene’s
articulation of a materialist-communicative model of rhetorical agency.
Ronald Walter Greene, Rhetoric and Capitalism: Rhetorical Agency as
Communicative Labor, 37 PHIL. & RHETORIC 188, 198–203 (2004). As Greene
writes, “[a]s such, rhetorical agency, in all its communicative dimensions, is at
once an instrument, object, and medium for harnessing social cooperation and
coordination as the life-affirming value of communicative labor.” Id. at 203–04.
17. Fernanda Doz Costa, Poverty and Human Rights: From Rhetoric to
Legal Obligations: A Critical Account of Conceptual Frameworks, 5 SUR - INT’L
J. HUM. RTS. 81, 81–82 (2008).
18. Fernanda Doz Costa describes this as the result of intellectual navel-
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theoretically significant if lawmakers increased restrictions on
gun possession,19 but that in and of itself is not an a priori
consideration despite vociferous advocacy. Likewise, arguments
pushing for increased gun ownership or less restrictions would
meet the same difficulty no matter how favored they were.
Rather, it is people’s lives that justify more stringent controls, or
less stringent according to some.
Gun rights are not
metonymical20 representations of liberty,21 but rather have the
gazing and bureaucratic machinations: “In today’s world, the human rights
movement is risking its credibility and moral strength if it fails to take account
of the suffering of millions of people living in poverty and to name that
suffering as a human rights violation. Intellectual obstacles cannot be used as
an excuse anymore. The powerful human rights machinery needs to be put to
the service of those who are still waiting to be invited to the banquet of this
opulent world.” Id. at 96.
19. Jennifer Agiesta, CNN Poll: Seven in 10 Favor Tighter Gun Laws in
Wake of Parkland Shooting, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 25, 2018, 3:16 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/25/politics/cnn-poll-gun-control-supportclimbs/index.html; Asma Khalid, NPR Poll: After Parkland, Number of
Americans Who Want Gun Restrictions Grows, NPR (Mar. 2, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/02/589849342/npr-poll-after-parkland-numberof-americans-who-want-gun-restrictions-grows; Danielle Kurtzleben, Poll:
Majorities of Both Parties Favor Increased Gun Restrictions, NPR (Oct. 13,
2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/13/557433452/poll-majorities-ofboth-parties-favor-increased-gun-restrictions; Kari Paul, The Vast Majority of
Young Americans Favor Stricter Gun Control, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 28, 2018,
9:19 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-vast-majority-of-millenn
ials-favor-gun-control-2017-10-27.
20. Shenli Song, Metaphor and Metonymy—A Tentative Research into
Modern Cognitive Linguistics, 1 THEORY & PRAC. LANGUAGE STUDS. 68, 69
(2011) (stating “[m]etonymy is a type of figurative language in which the name
of one thing is replaced with another commonly associated with it.”). See
generally Jialing Guan, The Cognitive Nature of Metonymy and Its
Implications for English Vocabulary Teaching, ENG. LANGUAGE TEACHING, Dec.
2009, at 179, 179–83 (providing multiple definitions of metonymy).
21. John Louis Lucaites and Maurice Charland Explain liberty as
ideography (written as <Liberty> or [Liberty]) thusly:
Our theoretical starting point is Michael Calvin McGee’s
analysis of [liberty] in the Whig/liberal ideology. According
to McGee, [liberty] is not a thing, but an “ideograph,” a term
or sign that must be used by public officials as a warrant for
the uses of state power within Whig/liberal societies. More
to the point, McGee claims that as a necessary commitment
to community, [liberty] lacks any fixed meaning. Rather, he
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very real effect of deciding who can own and use guns,22 which
then impacts the protection of law. The protection of lives is an
a priori consideration.23 One does not need a set of warrants to
arrive at this conclusion, one just knows it to be true. Opponents
of gun control will utter the phrase gun control at a rate far
greater than they will utter the phrase protect people’s lives
because the regulation or law ultimately is more important than
people’s lives due to some abstract notion of a posteriori
knowledge about rights discourse.24 The problem with a
posteriori claims is that we assume they are a priori without
suggests that at particular historical moments, those seeking
to exercise power in the name of the state deploy the
community’s generalized commitment to [liberty] as an
argumentative warrant for their actions, and then justify
their use of the term on the basis of a proffered interpretation
of the community’s collective tradition. Political practice is
thus based in a public, rhetorical production of history and
tradition that seeks to appropriate [liberty] to one’s ends.
John Louis Lucaites & Maurice Charland, The Legacy of [Liberty]: Rhetoric,
Ideology, and Aesthetics in the Postmodern Condition, 13 CANADIAN J. POL. &
SOC. THEORY 31, 33 (1989).
22. For an explanation of a materialist account of gun ownership, see
SimilarFreedom _, A Leftist Defense of Gun Ownership: Dialectical Materialist
Edition, MEDIUM (Mar. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@similarfree dom/aleftist-defense-of-gun-ownership-dialectical-materialist-editionbfa0d9a89d23.
23. Without going through an extensive discussion of a priori and a
posteriori knowledge, I take a priori knowledge to be that knowledge which can
be known without experience. It seems, then, that one need not have
experienced people to know that their lives matter. One might conclude that
absent interactions with people, one would not develop the necessary social
bonds needed to regard another’s life as worth saving, yet it seems that when
one understands that one is human, relying on the necessary language to
express a priori knowledge, because such understanding of language does not
destroy a claim that knowledge is a priori. See Jason S. Baehr, A Priori and A
Posteriori, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/
(last visited February 11, 2019); Bruce Russell, A Priori, STANFORD ENCYC.
PHILOSOPHY
(May 19, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/.
24. For an excellent discussion of the memes of gun control, specifically
those used by the political right, see Kelly McParland, Gun Control Shouldn’t
Be As Hard As Our Politicians Make It, NAT’L POST (Nov. 15, 2018, 6:30 AM),
https://nationalpost.com/opinion/kelly-mcparland-gun-control-shouldnt-be-ashard-as-our-politicians-make-it.
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investigating the a priori knowledge that underlies them.
Second, phenomenology places the people affected by legal
decisions at its center. It asks scholars and practitioners to be
people and think as people. Gone are the ideas of serving a
profession or serving the law, which are of course wellintentioned, but insert the vagaries of philosophy into the
miasma of people’s lives. This allows scholars to reason up from
people rather than reason down from the law’s totality. That
offers opportunity for a people-centered jurisprudence that
underlies many of the critical projects law has to offer.
Third, phenomenology reminds us that, despite the
memorization of rules for legal reasoning and writing, what legal
professionals work toward is people, not even just clients, but a
much broader array of people present and not in courtrooms and
legal offices. Law affects much more than the litigants of a
specific case. Here, it seems phenomenology is uniquely
positioned to do the work that Kwame Anthony Appiah has done
about difference.25 He writes in his book, Cosmopolitanism, that
we no longer live in a world of strangers, but are now rather
neighbors to more people than our ancestors could ever have
imagined.26 The ease of travel and access to technology, for some
of us, orients us toward so many people that we need an ethical
stance which takes difference into account.27 For Appiah, that
is cosmopolitanism; it is structured by a profound sense of
25. Appiah argues that we should let people be if their practices uphold
basic human dignity:
A liberal cosmopolitanism of the sort I am defending
might put its point like this: we value the variety of human
forms of social and cultural life; we do not want everybody to
become part of a homogeneous global culture; and we know
that this means that there will be local differences (both
within and between states) in moral climate as well. As long
as these differences meet certain general ethical constraints—as long, in particular, as political institutions respect basic
human rights—we are happy to let them be.
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 617, 621
(1997).
26. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF
STRANGERS xvi–xvii, 94–99 (2006).
27. Id. at 72–81.
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people’s importance—of their lived experiences.28
So,
phenomenology helps legal practitioners and scholars in a world
of difference, a world queer theory certainly understands, by
valuing people, their stories, their experiences, and the way they
all come to the law29 with different backgrounds. Because if
lawyers, judges, activists, and the rest of the legal dispositif30
are going to make law not only supportive of the rule of law,31
but responsive to people’s needs as well, then practitioners and
scholars will have to not only acknowledge, but also embrace
difference.
I focus on orientation because orienting oneself is what we
do on a daily basis. We orient the car in the driveway so it does
not hit the garage door, we orient ourselves in bed so as not to
wake a light sleeping partner, and we orient ourselves to new
students, new ways of teaching, and new job opportunities. All
of these orientations paint a picture of constant motion, of being
in space, but not in place. The distinction between space and
place has significance in legal analysis. Place defines. “Where
were you on the night of the crime?” “I’ll meet you at my law

28. Id. at xi–xii.
29. Nick J. Sciullo, Conversations with the Law: Irony, Hyperbole, and
Identity Politics or Sake Pase? Wyclef Jean, Shottas, and Haitian Jack: A HipHop Creole Fusion of Rhetorical Resistance to the Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
455, 495–96 (2009).
30. Michel Foucault writes:
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a
thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses,
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws,
administrative
measures,
scientific
statements,
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in
short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements
of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of
relations that can be established between these elements.
Michel Foucault, The Confession of the Flesh, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 194 (Colin Gordon ed., Gordon,
et al. trans. 1980).
31. Hilary Lim, Mapping Equity’s Place: Here Be Dragons, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAW 125, 126–27 (Anne
Bottomley ed., 1996).
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office at 9:00 a.m.” “The clerk’s office is on the second floor of the
county court building.” Space describes. One goes to a baseball
game because the game is a constructed space of movement, not
because of the reinforced concrete structure of the stadium itself.
Dave Matthews writes of “the space between” two people in a
complex relationship as that great unknowable gap in
communication that allows us to fail to ever fully describe that
which we attempt to describe.32 Space appreciates uncertainty
and angst whereas place seeks to illuminate both.
This distinction is one that does not readily occur in legal
analysis.
Occasionally, the dismissive language used to
condemn critical legal studies as relativistic33 hints at this idea
of motion, but rarely is there an appreciation for the constant
change of law and legal teaching. To be sure, it can be difficult
to appreciate change in the weeds of teaching. Likewise, in one’s
first year of law school, or even during bar review or application
to another graduate program, it can be difficult to appreciate law
32. Dave Matthews Band sings:
The space between
Where you smile and hide
Is where you’ll find me if I get to go
The space between
The bullets in our firefight
Is where I’ll be hiding, waiting for you
The rain that falls
Splashed in your heart
Ran like sadness down the window into your room
The space between
Our wicked lies is
The hope to keep safe from pain
DAVE MATTHEWS BAND, The Space Between, on EVERYDAY (RCA 2001).
33. See Terence Kane, David Brooks: Relativist, or Just a Critical Legal
Studies Theorist?, HILL (May 29, 2009, 12:14 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs
/pundits-blog/media/30776-david-brooks-relativist-or-just-a-critical-legalstudies-theorist.
Robin West summarizes this position: “[R]elativism,
according to modern objectivists, is politically objectionable in its tendency
toward ‘quietism’: its pacific acceptance of whatever social structures have
produced the interests, projects, goals, and ‘personal economies’ on which all
value is contingent.” Robin L. West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE
L.J. 1473, 1476–77 (1990).
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as a spatial phenomenon when it seems to be an orderly
progression from place to place. These are competing notions of
law—law as stable and more or less orderly, and law as radically
complicated and changing, albeit quite slowly. It is at that
shutter, the collapsing of stability, in which we find orientation
and disorientation.
From there, practitioners and scholars can theorize what
their position means in relation to law. Disorientation can be a
site of power and repression.34 If one feels disoriented by a legal
system that continues to misgender people,35 or if people refuse
to sell things or provide services to someone claiming First
Amendment protection,36 then disorientation can be quite
debilitating. One literally loses the ability to be the person one
is. Yet, one might read Sara Ahmed’s work to emphasize the
productive capacity of disorientation as a time where, despite
34. Niall Martin & Mireille Rosello, Disorientation: An Introduction, 57
CULTURE, THEORY & CRITIQUE 1, 3 (2016).
35. Sade Kondelin, Dis/Orientations of Gender and Sexuality in
Transgender Embodiment, 8 SUOMEN QUEER-TUTKIMUKSEN SEURAN LEHTI 32,
36 (2014) (noting that “[b]eing misgendered, or failing to pass as or to blend in
with our intended gender, as a continuously repeating experience that it can
be in the lives of transgender bodies, is easy to perceive as such a crisis”); Kevin
Allen, Queer Mirror: Transitory Pronoun Disorientation, BEATROUTE (Sept. 9,
2014, 3:23 PM), http://beatroute.ca/2014/09/09/queer-mirror-transitorypronoun-disorientation/ (“Mason explains that it is not the end of the world to
misgender someone but that people should endeavor to work on their pronoun
use to not make the same mistakes repeatedly. ‘For trans people it is not a
one-off occurrence – they do not get misgendered that one time only –
eventually there is a cumulative effect,’ he adds.”); CN Lester, On
Misgendering and Authenticity, A GENTLEMAN AND A SCHOLAR (Sept. 26, 2013),
https://cnlester.wordpress.com/2013/09/26/on-misgendering-and-authe nticity/
(stating “[t]here feels like an assumption that misgendering is far less serious
when it’s done to someone who isn’t (or isn’t straight forwardly/exclusively) a
woman or man – that it’s to be expected, that it won’t hurt so much. Yes, there
are genderqueer people who aren’t bothered by pronouns/descriptors – but, for
many of us, it hurts a great deal”); Meg Zulch, 7 Things Genderqueer People
Want
You
To
Know,
BUSTLE
(Dec.
3,
2015),
https://www.bustle.com/articles/124009-7-things-genderqueer-people-wantyou-to-know (Zulch explains: “I am consistently invalidated through
misgendering, with the constant use of ‘girl,’ ‘woman,’ and ‘miss’ when
referring to me (even after I correct people). It’s disorienting, frustrating, and
often makes me feel invisible”).
36. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719 (2018).
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the odds, one can feel the intellectual commitment all the more
to one’s self and one’s issues, producing affirmation by others in
the witnessed struggle of one’s life.
Disorientation happens differently for different people. Just
as everything from graduate or law school to the common cold
affect people in different ways despite being substantially
similar things, processes, or conditions, disorientation can
happen differently based on people’s identity markers, social
mores, legal systems, and many other contextual factors. For
these reasons, theorizing disorientation as a discrete process of
alienation37 from one’s self38 or one’s relations39 would describe
disorientation in a way that neither appreciates its debilitating
nor empowering attributes.40
Orientation is central to the ways we discuss law, the ways
judges, practitioners, clients, and scholars write and speak
about it, and the ways we always seem to have a relationship to
it.41 Law seems to be a prepositional affair. Under law, this or
that happens.42 In this way, law seems to be an umbrella of sorts
37. Ryan C. Parrey, Being Disoriented: Uncertain Encounters with
Disability, 36 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2016), http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/4555
/4299.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Martin & Rosello, supra note 34, at 1–4.
41. This relationship is often discussed with specific reference to
minoritarian populations relationship to law as distinct from whatever might
be normal in a legal system, which in the United States is often a white,
Christian, middle-class, cisgendered, moderately educated, able-bodied man.
These discussions occur across legal practice areas and legal theories. See
generally Gordon Christie, Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples, 2 INDIGENOUS
L. J. 68–115 (2003) (discussing aboriginal peoples’ relationship to law); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal
Thought of the 1970’s, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9 (1989) (discussing women’s
relationship to law); Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of
Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law
from 1619 to 1972 and a Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based
Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207 (2006) (discussing the relationship
of Black persons to law).
42. The use of this preposition in describing a relationship with law dates
to Antiquity:
Secondly, in the hunt for a better - and more substantial awareness of the “law”, we intend to revisit the different
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under which one hides to avoid the rain of illegality. “[A]s an
accord and satisfaction is grounded in contract law, there must
be consideration and a meeting of the minds with the intent to
compromise.”43 This orientation considers law a discrete field
that is limited by some constructed constraints. It always
implies an out. So, whereas contract law might tell us
something, if we are outside of contract law, then this
orientation radically changes what contract law can do for us.
When we write about the law, instead of law, we assume a
unified and monolithic structure of law; however, we know that
legal actors in their fetishistic desire for stability, often
misrepresent law. The law is muddled, confusing, consistent in
its inconsistency, and legal actors are prone to irresponsible,
unethical, and biased behavior. Judges let in their personal
beliefs, and we thankfully have Sonia Sotomayor who finally
disavowed us of the sophomoric belief that people magically
notions related to the “rule of law”. Although it is true that
they are neither equivalent nor unequivocal, they might shed
some light into our discussion, from the classical distinction
between the “government of/under men” (“passion”) and the
“government of/under laws” (“reason”) in Socrates, Plato and
Aristotle, and the principles of “equality before/under law”
(identified with the Greek word isonomia), or “freedom
before/under law” in Marcus Tullius Cicero and in Edward
Coke to the contemporary distinctions between the
“adjudicative/judicial or legislative rule of law” and the
“constitutional or institutional rule of law”, including the
tensions between the ragione di Stato (i.e. reason of State)
and the Stato della ragione (i.e. State of reason); the
Machtstaat (i.e. State of power/force) and rechtsstaat (i.e.
State of law); derecho de Estado (i.e. law of State) and Estado
de derecho (i.e. State of law or even State-law); and, law’s
empire - the expression popularized by Ronald Dworkin – or
even empire of law.
Imer B. Flores, Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional
Democracy), in LAW, LIBERTY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 77, 78 (Imer B. Flores &
Kenneth E. Hemma eds., Springer Netherlands 2013). See generally A.B.A.,
Law Day 2015 Magna Carta: Symbol of Freedom Under Law, AM. BAR ASS’N
DIV. PUB. EDUC., https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public
_education/LawDay2015/LawDayGuide2015.pdf (using “under law” to
structure modern legal understanding).
43. Emrick v. First Nat’l Bank of Jonesboro, 756 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001) (emphasis added).
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waived away their phenomenological life when they decided or
argued a case.44 Yes, the use of the definite article implies a
relationship, a homogeneity, that using the indefinite article or
the plural does not. The law, a law, and laws all perform
different functions and express a set of constraints that
structure our orientation to law. Above the law carries with it
its own set of syntactical orientations.45 If one is above the law
or acting as though they are above the law, they are orienting
themselves as more important than law or as though they do not
have an orientation to law because it does not apply to them,
which is of course also an orientation.
The point is that we are always oriented toward law. We
are under it, above it, in it, and so on. So, one’s orientation in
society is moderated constantly by legal orientation. This double
move, or rather complexity of orientation, means people are
always oriented in law even as they orient without it. That is,
one cannot refuse legal orientation. However, one can act in
ways that advance an orientation contra law. Thus, legal
orientation does not prevent our resistance; rather, it can be a
source of it.46
Belgian painter Erik Pevernagie describes the disease in
orientation work in his description of his oil painting “Everybody
his story:”

44. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J.
87, 92 (2002) (“Hence, one must accept the proposition that a difference there
will be by the presence of women and people of color on the bench. Personal
experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see.”); Justice Sonia
Sotomayor & Robert A. Stein, The 2016 Stein Lecture: A Conversation
Between U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Professor Robert
A. Stein, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2139, 2152–53, 2159–60 (2017).
45. Most legal commentators will be familiar with Above the Law, which
“takes a behind-the-scenes look at the world of law. The site provides news and
insights about the profession’s most colorful personalities and powerful
institutions, as well as original commentary on breaking legal developments,”
quite often reporting on and criticizing those who think they are better than
the legal system, legal education, professional responsibility, etc. Breaking
Media, About, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 8, 2010, 8:37 PM), https://
abovethelaw.com/about/.
46. See Martin & Rosello, supra note 34, at 7 (noting “[d]isorientation
equalises, that is, works against hierarchy and perhaps against injustices, be
they social or physical”).
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We want life to make sense. If we don’t find
meaning or orientation, we are bound to fabulate
a living and invent an inspiring life story. When
we write out a chosen script, we’ll have to make
time to hunker down into attuning it to the
hitches of the roadmap, time and again, with
fractious patience.47
For Pevernagie, our quest is to orient or risk the unknowing
oscillation of disorientation. The hunkering down to the hitches
of the road is the important “wake work”48 of queerness.
Christina Sharpe’s wake work is the necessary self-care of riding
the wake of the ship for Black folks who must grapple with
slavery’s haunting.49 Sharpe discusses wake as both a riding of
the wake in forced diasporic dispersal as well as the wake of
being with the dead, and the notion of waking up or coming into
a consciousness.50 Although this wake work is situated in an
affirmation of Blackness in the face of systemic violence,
Sharpe’s analysis provides meaningful paths for the furtherance
of a queer phenomenology. She centers the experience of slavery
in Blackness being the same ways the homophobic51 and
transphobic52 laws of the last several centuries might be
centered in queerness. Because queerness is always modified by
law, not because one cannot be queer, although perhaps modern
political violence from the current conservative administration
47. Erik Pevernagie, Everybody His Story, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (2000),
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Everybody_his_story.jpg
(last visited Apr. 5, 2019).
48. Mackala Lacy, Wake Work – Self Care for the Black Community, OUT
OF NOWHERE, (Feb. 18, 2015), https://outofnowhereblog.wordpress.com
/2015/02/18/wake-work-self-care-for-the-black-community/.
49. See generally CHRISTINA SHARPE, IN THE WAKE: ON BLACKNESS AND
BEING (2016).
50. Id.
51. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS:
SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003 (2008); DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE
LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2004); Clifford Rosky, Anti-Gay Curriculum Laws, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (2017).
52. See Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgender People
Strangers to the Law, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 150, 153–55 (2005).
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might suggest otherwise, law exists in a complex net that we
have trouble escaping.
Law is experience. Rather than imagine queerness as solely
a theoretical project divorced from material conditions, queer
theory should be considered a materialist discourse in that it
connects both high theory and materialism. It then mirrors
Sharpe’s wake work because it is historically indebted,
theoretically rich, and materially oriented. This then makes
queerness, queer theory, or queer theorizing ideal for analyzing
law because law does not exist beyond us, but rather is
intimately bound up in all we do. It is something we do and we
work with and against. It is our drive to work and our lease. It
is what and how we watch and do things. This understanding
forces scholars to think about law in the present, instead of
thinking of law’s immanence. By considering law in this way,
scholars only risk improving their interactions with and
theorizing of minoritarian populations, connecting more
meaningfully to diverse theoretical perspectives, and orienting
law toward change.
On Orientation
Edmund Husserl is often considered the founder of
phenomenological inquiry.53
Phenomenology centered
experience while eschewing metaphysical commitments.54 This
53. See generally JAMES M. EDIE, EDMUND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY: A
CRITICAL COMMENTARY (1987) (discussing Husserl’s phenomenology in depth);
JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS, EDMUND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY (1994)
(discussing the importance of Husserl to phenomenology and broader relevance
to continental philosophy).
54. One approach to describing the distinct nature of phenomenology
relative to other foundational philosophical perspectives is:
Philosophers have sometimes argued that one of these fields
is “first philosophy”, the most fundamental discipline, on
which all philosophy or all knowledge or wisdom rests.
Historically (it may be argued), Socrates and Plato put ethics
first, then Aristotle put metaphysics or ontology first, then
Descartes put epistemology first, then Russell put logic first,
and then Husserl (in his later transcendental phase) put
phenomenology first.
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was an important change in the rather dense and seemingly
disconnected-from-life philosophy that dominated much
philosophical work from the Renaissance to Husserl’s time.
Now, phenomenology often takes the form of evoking personal
experiences while checking one’s philosophical bags at the door.
Yet, it is not so much that we cannot discuss metaphysical
issues, but rather that we must include experience. The
inclusion of experience radically reshaped philosophy leading to
or otherwise informing standpoint theory,55 ethnography,56 and
autoethnography.57 For Husserl, it was all about the table, a
David Woodruff Smith, Phenomenology, STANFORD ENCYC. PHILOSOPHY (Dec.
16, 2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/; see also Denis
Seron, Phenomenology in the Present-Day Philosophy, HUSSERL ARCHIVE,
https://www.newschool.edu/nssr/husserl/Future/Part%20Three/Seron.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2019) (“That phenomenology somehow opposes meta
physics is clear, but this should not mislead us into supposing that it makes all
metaphysics impossible.”).
55. See Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 63, 93–99 (1993). See generally Sandra Harding, Introduction:
Standpoint Theory as a Site of Political, Philosophic, and Scientific Debate, in
THE FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY READER 1–15 (Sandra Harding ed., 2004)
(arguing for standpoint theory’s centrality to feminist theory); Susan Hekman,
Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited, 22 SIGNS: J. WOMEN
& CULTURE SOC’Y 341, 341–65 (1997) (arguing that writing off standpoint
theory is a premature conclusion and that standpoint theory addresses
fundamental questions about women’s experience with and in the world);
Maksim Kokushkin, Standpoint Theory is Dead, Long Live Standpoint Theory!
Why Standpoint Thinking Should be Embraced by Scholars Who Do Not
Identify as Feminists?, J. ARTS & HUMAN., July 2014, at 8, 8–20 (arguing that
standpoint theory enables new knowledges and focuses on disempowered
groups).
56. See generally Jack Katz & Thomas J. Csordas, Phenomenological
Ethnography in Sociology and Anthropology, 4 ETHNOGRAPHY 275, 275–88
(2003) (discussing the relationship between ethnography and phenomenology
in sociology and anthropology); Alexander Kozin, On Making Legal Emergency:
Law Office at is Most Expeditious, F. QUALITATIVE SOC. RES., Jan. 2007, at 1,
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/202/
447
(discussing the role of ethnography in a law office as informing
phenomenology); Sarah S. Willen, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of
“Illegality”: State Power, Criminalization, and Abjectivity among
Undocumented Migrant Workers in Tel Aviv, Israel, INT’L MIGRATION, July
2007, at 8, 8–38 (discussing the role of phenomenological ethnography in
understanding illegal migration).
57. Andrew C. Sparkes argues that autoethnographies “are highly
personalized accounts that draw upon the experience of the author/researcher
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metaphor deeply significant to philosophy.
This table was central in Husserl’s phenomenology. This
metaphor helped explain place and space, the relationship one
has to both, and also the site of life from eating to work. The
table was a point at which phenomenology began. The table is
in many ways an interesting choice for Husserl, indebted as he
was to Karl Marx’s description of the dancing table in Capital,
Vol. 1.58 For Husserl, the table is both the focal point and anchor
to orientation.59 His extensive description of the table provides
much of what one needs to know to appreciate the complexities
of orientation and its central role in subject creation. Marx
described a dancing table, one animated by commodity
fetishism. This dancing was of course figurative, but describes
the world of the commodity when it is infused with exchange
value, masking over the labor and laborers who made it. The
table dances as a commodity as if it were not created as a table.
Marx describes this table:
The form of wood, for instance, is altered if a
table is made out of it. Nevertheless the table
continues to be wood, an ordinary, sensuous thing.
But as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it
changes into a thing which transcends
sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on
that ground, but in relation to all other
commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out
of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more
wonderful than if it were to begin dancing on its
own free will.60

for the purposes of extending sociological understanding.” Andrew C. Sparkes,
Autoethnography and Narratives of Self: Reflections on Criteria in Action, 17
SOC. SPORT J. 21, 21 (2000). See generally Sally Denshire, On AutoEthnography, 62 CURRENT SOC. REV. 831 (2014) (discussing some of the
difficulties in writing about one’s experiences in an autoethnography).
58. KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL (Penguin Publ’g Grp. 1992) (1867).
59. SARA AHMED, QUEER PHENOMENOLOGY: ORIENTATIONS, OBJECTS,
OTHERS 35–37 (2006).
60. MARX, supra note 58, at 163–64.
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This animated table is an expression of orientation—one
deeply engrained, pun intended, in our relationship to the
object(ive) world. Husserl draws on this sense of orientation, the
relationship of the table to the chain of signifiers that makes up
capitalism, the relationship between the table and the floor and
the table to itself, in order to theorize a philosophy of objects, of
sensory experiences that does not pause to contemplate the table
dancing, but rather focuses on our relationship to the table. It
is this relationship with objects that creates the subject. Such a
theory encourages individuals to theorize their own relationship
to the objects of law (statutes, the Constitution, etc.), the actors
of law (law enforcement, lawyers, etc.), the producers of law
(judges, elected officials, etc.), and the process of law (court
proceedings, legislative processes, etc.). This would, holistically,
help individuals better understand and relate to legal systems.
Husserl brings this to bear on the writing desk. For many
legal scholars this will seem familiar—writing as life-affirming
labor.61 In Ideas I,62 Husserl argues that the writer is oriented
toward the writing table, but also that one’s experience is that
such claims naturally arise that one cannot experience.63 We
may claim that the coffee cup is on the coffee table, yet
perceptually we cannot perceive what is under the coffee cup.
Likewise, while the writer is often oriented toward the writing
table, the writer may in fact only express an orientation toward
the computer or the piece of paper. So too might we orient
ourselves toward the orientation, a second-order orientation so
that rather than be a writer at a writer’s desk, we might imagine
ourselves a thinker, an artist, or a theorist. Orientation plays a
central role in identity formation and interactions with the
world.
Then, to put all of one’s cards on the table carries with it a
deeper meaning that from Marx through Husserl seems to be
akin to wearing oneself on one’s sleeve. The phenomenological
experience of being becomes intimately tied to one’s relationship
to the table.
61. See Greene, supra note 16 at 204.
62. EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE
PHENOMENOLOGY (W. R. Boyce Gibson trans., Routledge 2012) (1931).
63. Wolfgang Huemer, Husserl and Haugeland on Constitution, 137
SYNTHESE 345–68 (2003).
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Understanding orientation as something so fundamental to
our being helps explain why the phrase sexual orientation is so
important. Quite simply it is about being. When we think about
law, then, I would challenge us to think about the queer body.
To some extent, legal scholars are doing great work on race,
gender, and religion, but we have yet to bring forth the
experiences of queer folks with the same intellectual rigor and
phenomenological passion that we have brought to other
identities and other critical legal theories. To be sure, Dean
Spade64 and Devon Carbado65 have completed much of this work,
but legal practitioners and scholars still need theories to help
think through the world as cause and effect of queerness. Yet,
they struggle to think about the queer body, both because law
struggles to come to grips with new understandings of the body
and because law struggles to understand queerness. So, then,
legal scholars, lawyers, and law students are doubly deficient in
writing, speaking, and thinking about the queer body.
Queer bodies defy the heteronormative codes of appropriate
conduct, of what it means to go swimming,66 of what it means to
64. See generally Dean Spade, Compliance is Gendered: Transgender
Survival and Social Welfare, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS: HISTORY, POLITICS AND
LAW 217 (Paisley Currah et. al eds., 2006); Rickke Mananzala & Dean Spade,
The Nonprofit Industrial Complex and Trans Resistance, 5 SEXUALITY RES. &
SOC. POL’Y 53 (2008); Dean Spade, Introduction: Transgender Issues and the
Law, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 445 (2010); Dean Spade, Medicaid Policy &
Gender-Confirming Healthcare for Trans People: An Interview with Advocates,
8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 497 (2010); Dean Spade & Sel Wahng, Transecting the
Academy, 10 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUDS. 240 (2004); Dean Spade, Keynote
Address: Trans Law Reform Strategies, Co-Optation, and the Potential for
Transformative Change, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 288 (2009); Dean Spade:
Keynote Address: Trans Law & Politics on a Neoliberal Landscape, 18 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353 (2009).
65. See generally Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil
Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1467 (2000); Devon W. Carbado, Privilege, in BLACK
QUEER STUDIES: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 190 (E. Patrick Johnson & Mae G.
Henderson eds., 2005); Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15
BERKLEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76 (2000).
66. Michelle O’Toole, I Am Scared of Cisgender People: My Time at a
Transgender Swimming Club, PINK NEWS (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:20PM),
https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2015/12/22/i-am-scared-of-cisgender-people-mytime-at-a-transgender-swimming-club/;
David
Rieder,
Transgender
Swimmers: The Rules for Inclusion and Fairness, SWIMMING WORLD (Dec. 19,
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.swimmingworldmagazine.com/news/transgender
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dress,67 excrete,68 and be. These codes are of course present in
courtrooms and law offices, both formally and informally. They
exist even when one takes the Bar Exam and must wear
supposedly gender-specific business clothing. Of all the skills
necessary to practice law or think meaningfully about law,
wearing prescribed professional clothes cannot possibly be one
of them. Furthermore, the argument that professional dress
builds confidence in the profession or academic discipline seems
to neglect every 1L’s experience of constantly being asked by
one’s friends and family about the legality of actual and
hypothetical actions after learning of one’s participation in legal
education. That is, once friends become aware of one’s legal
education, they regularly inquire about legal matters, both
within the scope of law classes and so far outside of most people’s
experience in law, and pose questions that even the best-rated
lawyer in town could not answer without hours of research.
One’s clothing choice seems not to matter at these times.
Swimming seems simple enough. Enjoy a nice day at the
pool or at the beach. Swim competitively, for fitness, or just to
play. However, swimming is not so simple for transgender
people, who must rightly critique and are critiqued by people
with simple assumptions about whether they can swim and
where. Bathrooms, changing rooms, and locker rooms all
become sites of contestation over who counts as a person. Each
space, each stall door is an opportunity for new thinking about
body, relationships, and being. Swimming becomes not just a
material repositioning of gendered space, but also a metaphor
-swimmers-the-rules-for-inclusion-and-fairness/.
67. See generally CLARE SEARS, ARRESTING DRESS: CROSS-DRESSING, LAW,
AND FASCINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY SAN FRANCISCO (2014) (arguing
laws against cross dressing expressed a fascination with behaviors far outside
typical legal regulation); Morag Curtis & Karen Morris, Cross-Dressing as a
Meaningful Occupation: A Single Case Study, 78 BRITISH J. OCCUPATIONAL
THERAPY 706 (2015) (discussing the role of cross-dressing in identity
formation).
68. See generally Allison Bader, Whose Bathroom Is It, Anyway?: The
Legal Status of Transgender Bathroom Access Under Federal Employment
Law, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 711 (2018); Marka B. Fleming & Gwendolyn
McFadden-Wade, The Legal Implications Under Federal Law When States
Enact Biology-Based Transgender Bathroom Laws for Students and
Employees, 29 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 157 (2018); Stephen Rushin & Jenny
Carroll, Bathroom Laws as Status Crimes, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2017).
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for movements against the gender current of not so
postmodernist society.
Modern workplace dress codes may be changing, but not as
quickly or as thoroughly as transgender people may like. What
counts as acceptable workplace attire still exists in a gendered
matrix. Read Internet message boards about the last time a
heterosexual cisgender female wore a tie to a Hollywood
opening, and if one digs deep enough into the online comments,
one is sure to come across heteronormative, vitriolic hate. Dress
has long been associated with acceptability. Baggy jeans, hats,
ties, dress length, and other clothing markers all signify who a
person is, reinforcing certain scripts in normative evaluations of
appropriate dress. The workplace is no different. The cool or
apathetic professor wears sandals or, like one of my law school
professors, the same tie every day because he is forced to wear a
tie to teach. The intern always wears “edgy” outfits. Casual
Fridays mean polo shirts or flats. Obviously, these distinctions
are arbitrary. At no point does skirt length mean anything other
than the wearer has selected that skirt length to wear.
These issues matter to law because they highlight how
important the body is, its presentation, and its relationship to
other bodies and social and professional norms. Queer and
transgender people, because of their non-normative status, are
frequently positioned in difficult situations—always out of place.
As such, a phenomenological inquiry into law asks that
practitioners and scholars appreciate how important the body is
to law.
On Accommodation
Sara Ahmed reminds us, “We learn about worlds when they
do not accommodate us. Not being accommodated can be
pedagogy.”69 So, then, rather than confine our identities in law
to specific interactions like when one is admitted to law school,
wins their first CALI award,70 or passes the Bar Exam, what

69. Sara Ahmed, An Affinity of Hammers, 3 TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 22,
22 (2016).
70. CALI is an acronym for Center for Computer Assisted Legal
Instruction. A CALI Award is often given out for the highest grade in a class.
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Ahmed suggests is that we learn when we are not accepted.
Rather than house our knowledge in an intellectual space of
accommodation and inclusion, hoping that traditional liberalism
is the cure to our ills, we need a more radical orientation toward
our disorientation or all those times when we do not fit in or are
not accommodated. Such an orientation underscores the
fundamental inequality at the root of our legal system, a system
built on indigenous genocide, slavery, police brutality, the denial
of people’s right to vote, and trans exclusion.
The operative question in law is: how do we orient ourselves
in the world given that we are often not the only ones working
on our orientation? Compulsory heterosexism structures bodies,
bodies that “enable some action only insofar as they restrict the
capacity for other kinds of action.”71 Whatever one’s sexual
orientation, how one expresses that orientation, or how one
attempts to orient themselves to the world, orientations can
restrict action.
Yet, they are also generative; that is,
orientations can create relationships to others and the world.
That orientations both serve a restrictive and generative
function underscores their foundational importance as a site of
power, and, as well, expresses the need to be responsive about
the ways in which orientations may be placed on us by legal
systems, teachers, relatives, and even friends. It is not that we
should do away with orientations, but rather that we must be
mindful of how orientation enables and hinders, empowers and
disempowers.
We know, following the work of Michel Foucault72 and
The point is, rather than define oneself by various one-off events, it makes
more sense to think holistically about one’s identity rather than confine
identity to a certain grade point average or award.
71. AHMED, supra note 59, at 91.
72. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
32–57 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); see also Maria
A. Dixon, Transforming Power: Expanding the Inheritance of Michel Foucault
in Organizational Studies, 20 MGMT. COMM. Q. 283, 289 (2007) (“Foucault
added the idea that a central conduit for this power is the human network of
relationships (a basis he subsequently revisited in other conceptions of power)
in which power is fluid and constantly moving”). Furthermore, we know that
this is not simply an esoteric philosophical matter, but rather that the fluidity
of power affects legal practice. See, e.g., William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat,
Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client
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Judith Butler,73 to whom Ahmed is much in debt,74 that power is
fluid, and that being powerful in one instance may produce
disempowerment in the next. This is why the work of law is so
difficult. In the balance of equitably distributing rights, one
must move around, squirm, slide, and slip through power space.
Taking charge of one’s orientation can steady one’s body in
disorientation, enabling one to better meet the challenges of the
day and address the day’s challenges.
Obviously, it can be difficult to do this given the way law
treats its most vulnerable. It is dangerous to be queer, and that
is why so many people struggle to find a position in law. Yet,
phenomenology is a self-affirming experience that opens doors
for being. Still, one might ask, “Can I be in law, and what does
that mean for me and others?”
This question of being rests on the appreciation of the bodyas-such. That is, the body must be recognized as human and not
as an object. Understanding the body-as-such undermines, if not
ameliorates, the alienating power of law. The most dramatic
alienation in law was slavery.75 Slave owners regard Black
Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1497 (1992).
73. Much of Judith Butler’s work has revolved around divorcing gender
from sex and, in turn, describing how gender is fluid. Judith Butler & Cristan
Williams, Judith Butler on Gender and the Trans Experience: “One Should Be
Free to Determine the Course of One’s Gendered Life,” VERSO (May 26, 2015),
https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2009-judith-butler-on-gender-and-thetrans-experience-one-should-be-free-to-determine-the-course-of-one-sgendered-life.
74. Carolyn Pedwell & Anne Whitehead, Affecting Feminism: Questions
of Feeling in Feminist Theory, 13 FEMINIST THEORY 115, 116 (2012). For
example, comparing quotations from Ahmed, Butler, and Foucault reveals a
concern with the body, power, identity, and orientation linking the authors.
Aaron Bady, 7 Days of Queer Theory, NEW INQUIRY (June 25, 2012), https:
//thenewinquiry.com/blog/7-days-of-queer-theory/.
75. Vincent Brown writes:
By making men, women, and children into commodities,
enslavement destroyed lineages, tethering people to owners
rather than families, and in this way it “annulled lives,
transforming men and women into dead matter, and then
resuscitated them for servitude.” Admittedly, the enslaved
“lived and breathed, but they were dead in the social world of
men.” As it turns out, this kind of alienation is also part of
what it presently means to be African American.
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people as not bodies-as-such, but rather as objects.76 This
commodification, the systematic annihilation of the body as
subjective in favor of an objective understanding produced the
disempowering logic that allowed for white slave owners to deny
Black life, rights, and respect.77 There was no body in this logic
Vincent Brown, Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery, 114 AM.
HIST. REV. 1231, 1237–38 (2009). See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY
AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 35–76 (1982) (discussing the trauma
of alienation); Sarah Demetris Turner, African Americans’ Experiences of
Estrangement and Alienation: A Comparative Analysis of Georg Simmel’s
Essay “The Stranger” 12–16 (August 2002) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Texas
Tech University) (on file with the Texas Tech Library) (discussing the long
history of African Americans’ alienation in the United States).
76. Steven C. Tracy offers the analysis bluntly: “[T]he slave was an object,
a problem.” Steven C. Tracy, Introduction: Hughes in Our Time, in A
HISTORICAL GUIDE TO LANGSTON HUGHES 8 (Steven C. Tracy ed., 2004). Take
for example:
[T]he 1926 League of Nations’ definition of slavery as “the
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the
powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised,” a
definition which focuses on the master’s ownership of the
slave and hence implicitly stresses that the slave was an
object of property.
Ann-Marie Sharon Forgét, The Roman Captive: An Iconographical and
Cultural Study 19 (1996) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Victoria) (on
file with the National Library of Canada).
77. Patricia M. Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Forgotten
Crime Against Humanity as Defined by International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 883, 892–93 (2004). Even if one does not accept the denial of humanity,
the language games of ascriptive identity put Black humanity in question. As
Laurent Dubois argues:
The history of slavery and colonialism constituted the
term “Black” as the name “of the slave: man-of-metal, manmerchandise, man-of-money” . . . . The word “designated not
human beings like all others but rather a distinct humanity—
one whose very humanity was (and still is) in question.”
Blackness came to “represent difference in its raw
manifestation—somatic, affective, aesthetic, imaginary.”
Symbiotically, Whiteness “became the mark of a certain
mode of Western presence in the world, a certain figure of
brutality and cruelty, a singular form of predation with an
unequaled capacity for the subjection and exploitation of
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for which slave owners were accountable.78 Yet, there are other
failures of the law to account for bodies, failures that denied the
body-as-such. Some examples include prohibitions on sex
between members of the same sex,79 international prohibitions
on extramarital sex,80 and prohibitions on sex work.81
It is, then, difficult to be in law, especially if one exhibits the
bodily comportment82 or engages in the body practices that resist
normative legal discourses.83
Of course, as many have
foreign peoples” . . . . Mbembe explores the structural drivers
and consequences for this process but also its affective and
psychological dimensions, the ways it constituted subjects
the world over. To be Black, he writes, was to become “the
prototype of a poisoned, burnt subject” and “a being whose
life is made of ashes.”
Laurent Dubois, Introduction to ACHILLE MBEMBE, CRITIQUE OF BLACK REASON
xi (Laurent Dubois trans., Duke Univ. Press Books 2017).
78. Kevin Bales, Slavery and the Human Right to Evil, 3 J. HUM. RTS. 53,
58 (2004).
79. Mark Strasser, Natural Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 51, 55–56 (1998) (suggesting that natural law may not support bans on
same sex marriage); Sara Querbes, The Supreme Court, Sodomy Laws and the
Impact of the LGBT Movement in America, TRANSCENDING SILENCE
https://www.albany.edu/womensstudies/journal/2004/querbes.htm
(2004)
(describing the impact of sodomy laws on same-sex sexual intercourse).
80. Alyssa Miller, Punishing Passion: A Comparative Analysis of Adultery
Laws in the United States of America and Taiwan and Their Effects on Women,
41 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 425, 427–36 (2018).
81. Gail M. Deady, The Girl Next Door: A Comparative Approach to
Prostitution Laws and Sex Trafficking Victim Identification Within the
Prostitution Industry, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 515, 522–25
(2011).
82. See generally David Allen Larson, Access to Justice for Persons with
Disabilities: An Emerging Strategy, 3 LAWS 220 (2014) (centering access to
justice as a need for improved training in law); Stephanie Ortoleva,
Inaccessible Justice: Human Rights, Persons with Disabilities and the Legal
System, 17 ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 281 (2011) (discussing barriers to disabled
persons’ access to law).
83. For lawyers, the matter of clothing seems one of the most restrictive
sites of normative legal theory. I remember working as a summer associate
and learning from a supervising attorney that some judges in the courts of
Virginia preferred women wear dresses and not pantsuits. This wisdom was
proffered in the mid-2000s, not 40 years ago. See Lynda K. Hopewell,
Appropriate Attire and Conduct for an Attorney in the Court Room, 12 J. LEGAL
PROF. 177 (1987); Spencer Allen, The Unimaginably Silly Resistance to
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experienced, even if one is cisgendered and able-bodied, the
complexity of laws, the difficulty one might have in finding them
or understanding them, and their differential enforcement mean
that being in law is always fraught with difficulty. Law’s
complexity can, in fact, make it difficult to be in law.84
This is to argue that understanding law as the cure for what
ails the body may be too optimistic when indeed pessimism is
likely to be a preferable position.85 The problem is not that law
cannot be helpful, empowering, or at the very least wellintentioned, but rather that in order to assure law is at its best,
scholars, students, and practitioners must be attuned to its
limitations, problems, and inevitable failures.86 The sorts of
euphoria that often result from “legal victories”87 often mean
relatively little to the person suffering the micro-88 and macroInseams in Women’s Clothing: The Battle for Pants in the Courtroom, BLOG
POSTS: RICHMOND JOURNAL LAW & TECH. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://jolt.richmond
.edu/2018/04/04/the-unimaginably-silly-resistance-to-inseams-in-womensclothing-the-battle-for-pants-in-the-courtroom/; Amanda Hess, Female
Lawyers Who Dress Too “Sexy” Are Apparently a “Huge Problem” in the
Courtroom, SLATE.COM (Mar. 21, 2014, 9:38 AM), https://slate.com/humaninterest/2014/03/female-lawyers-still-must-dress-conservatively-to-impressjudges.html.
84. Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The
Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L.
REV. 403, 404, 406–14 (1997).
85. Yet, we know that pessimism might actually be helpful in the study
and practice of law. Emily Zimmerman & Casey LaDuke, Every Silver Lining
Has a Cloud: Defensive Pessimism in Legal Education, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 823
(2017); Debra Cassens Weiss, Pessimistic Law Students More Successful,
Study Finds, ABA JOURNAL (Nov. 9, 2007, 12:18 PM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/pessimistic_lawyers_more_successful
_study_finds/.
86.
See generally Nick J. Sciullo, Zizek/Questions/Failing, 47
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 287 (2011) (describing failure’s centrality to law).
87. Ratna Kapur, There’s a Problem with the LGBT Rights Movement –
It’s Limiting Freedom, CONVERSATION (Sept. 17, 2018, 5:25 AM), http://the
conversation.com/theres-a-problem-with-the-lgbt-rights-movement-itslimiting-freedom-101999.
88. Microaggressions “are subtle, stunning, often automatic, and nonverbal exchanges which are ‘put downs’ of blacks by offenders.” Chester M.
Pierce et al., Introduction Television and Education to AN EXPERIMENT IN
RACISM: TV COMMERCIALS, 10 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 3 (1977). See generally Peggy
C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) (describing law as
a microaggression for Black persons because of pervasive bias); Kevin L. Nadal
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aggressions89 of a violent world. Rather than rest assured that
change is good, or even happening, the more critical approach to
legal thinking is one that is attuned to violence, drama, and
inadequacy. Instead of thinking about the way law protects the
most vulnerable, one must focus on the way law does not do this
in order to prevent a tendency to be too thankful, too subdued,
or too forgetful of the everyday struggles of people.90
Queer phenomenology is attuned to these struggles,
recognizing the difficulties of everyday life. It understands
microaggressions and the way queer bodies are pushed and
pulled into disorientation both by law and by individuals who
simply fail to think about queer people91 or who actively accost
them.92 Without the body, the ephemeral queer person lacks
urgency.93 In the same ways that people often struggle with
et al., Microaggressions Toward Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer,
and Genderqueer People: A Review of the Literature, 53 J. SEX RES. 488 (2016)
(describing microaggressions against LGBTQ + persons); Daniel G. Solórzano,
Critical Race Theory, Race and Gender, Microaggressions, and the Experience
of Chicana and Chicano Scholars, 11 QUALITATIVE STUDS. EDUC. 121 (1998)
(describing the experience of Latinx scholars with microaggressions); Derald
Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions and the Asian American Experience,
13 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 72 (2007) (describing
microaggressions against Asian Americans).
89. See generally KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME:
RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND
OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (2d ed., N.Y.U. Press 2008) (describing Black fear
of law enforcement using macroaggression as a theory).
90. Brentin Mock, Are States Actually Protecting the Most Vulnerable
with Their Justice Policies?, GRIST (Apr. 10, 2015), https://grist.org/politics/
are-states-actually-protecting-the-most-vulnerable-with-their-justicepolicies/; Julie Moreau, Federal Civil Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Transgender
Workers, Justice Department Says, NBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2017, 4:30 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/federal-civil-rights-law-doesn-tprotect-transgender-workers-justice-n808126.
91. An increasingly popular way to refer to this notion of ignoring queer
people or their oppression is queerblindness. Alexandrea Martin, Challenging
Corrections: Empowering LGBTQ Folx 43 (May 7, 2018) (unpublished Honors
Thesis, University of Iowa).
92. John Bowden, Anti-LGBT Violence Surged in 2017, HILL (Jan. 23,
2018, 9:36 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/370236report-anti-lgbt-violence-surged-in-2017.
93. Here, I am reminded of Adrienne Rich’s body politics and her belief
that the body was a cite of contestation and power:
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caring about international violence94 or human rights abuses95
because they do not know the victims and cannot perceive the
violence, so too is it easy to offer the palliative thought, well,
things seem to be getting better for the LGBTQ+ community.96
Regardless of how true that is, or even what it means with
respect to access to healthcare, employment benefits, and safety,
it eschews the responsibility we have for bodies in favor of grand
narratives of progress.97 Such a practice can never fully account
The moment when a feeling enters the body—is political.
This touch is political. By which I mean, that politics is the
effort to find ways of humanely dealing with each other—as
groups or as individuals—politics being simply process, the
breaking down of barriers of oppression, tradition, culture,
ignorance, fear, self-protectiveness.
ADRIENNE RICH, WHAT IS FOUND THERE: NOTEBOOKS ON POETRY AND POLITICS
24 (1993); see Jacek Kornak, Queer as a Political Concept 1–15 (Feb. 4, 2015)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Helsinki) (on file with author).
94. Gil Laroya, Why Don’t People Care When It Doesn’t Affect Them?,
HUFFPOST (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/gil-laroya/whydont-people-care-when_b_5888686.html.
95. See generally Doug Bandow, The Price of Ignoring Human Rights:
Lost Credibility, Brutal Allies and New Enemies, FORBES (June 19, 2017, 6:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2017/06/19/the-price-of-igno
ring-human-rights-lost-credibility-brutal-allies-and-newenemies/#4252ff30629e; David Ropeik, Statistical Numbing: Why Millions Can
Die and We Don’t Care, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY: HOW RISKY IS IT, REALLY? (Aug.
15,
2011),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/how-risky-is-itreally/201108/statistical-numbing-why-millions-can-die-and-we-don-t-care;
Sara Silverstein, The Price of America’s Withdrawal from the U.N. Human
Rights Council, WASH. POST: MADE BY HISTORY (July 19, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/07/19/the-price-ofamericas-withdrawal-from-the-u-n-human-rightscouncil/?utm_term=.09a6d5d6b07f.
96. That is, things are not nearly as good or getting better as quickly as
one might believe. See generally Reynaldo Leanos, Jr., When It Comes to
School Safety for LGBTQ Kids, Progress Has Slowed, Survey Finds, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 19, 2018, 4:32 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/ when-itcomes-school-safety-lgbtq-kids-progress-has-slowed-n922126; Julie Moreau,
Global LGBTQ Acceptance More Polarized, New Research Finds, NBC NEWS
(May 3, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/globallgbtq-acceptance-more-polarized-new-research-finds-n871106.
97. Robin Linde & Mikaila Mariel Lemonik Arthur, Teaching Progress: A
Critique of the Grand Narrative of Human Rights as Pedagogy for
Marginalized Students, 103 RADICAL TCHR. 26, 28, 33–34 (2015).
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for the body.
Hammering at Law
In our daily lives we need to follow Ahmed’s “affinity of
hammers,” that embraces the ways we can chip away at
oppressive systems and practices.98 An affinity of hammers is
Ahmed’s insistence on the importance of the little work we do
every day that may not seem significant or may easily be cast
aside by those more interested in mergers and acquisitions.
These actions do not always highlight a clear path to success. It
may not seem like much just as it is difficult to envision oneself
a lawyer or writing one’s first law review article. One may not
envision a shift to social democracy or radical equality in the
style of Ernesto Laclau or Chantal Mouffe99 from every time they
refuse the socially condoned laughter at a racist joke or when
they refuse to read the 100th sexist tweet from one’s family
member, but it is these hammerings that, when taken
collectively, reshape the world. These hammerings create more
than they deconstruct. They allow us to feel collective pride in
the little things.
What is most interesting and perhaps least explored is this
idea of an affinity of and not an affinity for hammers. Again,
Ahmed has us playing with orientation. An affinity for hammers
would mean we like hammers, but not necessarily appreciate
what they do. An affinity of hammers expresses a relationship
to the hammers. Of means the affinity is constructed of what
hammers do,100 namely chip away at the oppressive systems that
make many of our lives atrocious. This rhetorical move is very
much central to her politics. If we orient ourselves toward the
work hammers do and not to the hammers themselves, then we
98. Ahmed, supra note 69, at 33.
99. See generally ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND
SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (Winston
Moore & Paul Cammack trans., Verso 2d ed. 2001) (1985) (focusing on
hegemony as an analytical tool in analyzing oppression and social action).
100. That is, the affinity is constituted of hammers. Of means the
substance constituting something, so then the affinity is constituted of
hammers, expressing the centrality of hammers and all that they do to
Ahmed’s praxis.
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center the work bodies can do.
Ahmed’s centering of hammering answers the exclusionary
politics of trans-exclusionary radical feminists101 by arguing that
we are all at once hammering away at the system when we
recognize the centrality of trans politics to the world. We need
the collective struggles of anti-fascist, anti-racist, anti-capitalist,
and other movements if we are going to make progress in the
world. Sometimes it is the hammering rather than the ideology
that we need to focus on in order to form meaningful coalitions.
As such, Ahmed has often been described as an anti-ideological
thinker because she is intimately concerned with the material
effects of her theories.102 Yet, one need not focus on material
concerns at the expense of ideology. In this light, Ahmed
provides legal scholars with the theory needed to come together
despite ideological differences.103
So, while lawyers may disagree about politics or theories of
government, they can come together about better transportation
funding because it will improve the community by making travel
safer, making it easier to go to work, and encouraging businesses
to locate in a location. For Ahmed, the same is true in queer

101. Cursed E, 10 TERF ‘Arguments’ That Need to Stop, MEDIUM (Feb. 5,
2018),
https://medium.com/@notCursedE/10-terf-arguments-that-need-tostop-80e34d07dae4; Kelsie Brynn Jones, Trans-Exclusionary Radical
Feminism: What Exactly Is it, and Why Does it Hurt?, HUFFPOST (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kelsie-brynn-jones/transexclusionary-radicalterf_b_5632332.html; Cristan Williams, You Might Be a TERF If. . ., TRANS
ADVOCATE (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.transadvocate.com/you-might-be-aterf-if_n_10226.htm. But see Sarah Ditum, What Is a Terf? How an Internet
Buzzword Became a Mainstream Slur, NEW STATESMAN AM. (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/feminism/2017/09/what-terf-howinternet-buzzword-became-mainstream-slur (arguing that “TERF” is a slur);
Meghan Murphy, ‘TERF’ Isn’t Just a Slur, It’s Hate Speech, FEMINIST CURRENT
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.feministcurrent.com/2017/09/21/terf-isnt-slurhate-speech/ (using a traditional liberal feminist paradigm to accuse people
who use the acronym “TERF” of hate speech).
102. See generally Cari Hovanec, A Critique of Affect Theory, CARI
HOVANEC (Mar. 31, 2018), http://www.carihovanec.com/blog/a-critique-ofaffect-theory/ (making an oblique critique of Ahmed’s work).
103. Nishta J. Mehra, Sara Ahmed: Notes from a Feminist Killjoy,
GUERNICA (July 17, 2017), https://www.guernicamag.com/sara-ahmed-thepersonal-is-institutional/ (describing how her work bridges divides and
requires revision).
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politics.104 This group, the trans-exclusionary radical feminists
(TERFs),105 is a real issue because instead of having an affinity
of hammers, their members have an affinity for narrow-minded,
anti-progressive, patriarchal backsliding.106 Because the TERFs
are part of the system against which the hammering is done,
they represent not a challenge to politics as usual to the
patriarchy and hierarchical, gendered thinking, but rather the
sort of politics against which queer politics positions itself. They
focus on a monolithic understanding of feminism that serves the
patriarchal and heteronormative system that disadvantages
them. There are always those that may in some ways be broadly
helpful to a cause (feminism), but hurtful to specific causes
(transgender rights). However, if we follow Ahmed by focusing
on the action—the hammering—then whatever disagreements
we have about identity might seem a little less important, as
hammering empowers and emboldens individuals to have better
daily experiences.
Queer phenomenology leads Ahmed in this direction, of
course. If we center the body, the material reality of being queer,
or even the materiality of being Black, disabled, or tall, we would
be better able to advocate together for improved material
conditions because the body would be our focus.
A queer phenomenology harnesses the tremendous diversity
of lived experiences of queer folks and can be an affinity of
hammers, an appreciation for collective work that does not
always seem meaningful, but when lifted up, raised up, its
104. SARA AHMED, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF EMOTION 165 (2d ed. 2014)
(stating “[t]he hope of queer politics is that bringing us closer to others, from
whom we have been barred, might also bring us to different ways of living with
others”).
105. Jones, supra note 101; see also Michelle Goldberg, What Is A
Woman?, NEW YORKER: AM. CHRONICLES (July 28, 2014), https://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/woman-2; Danelle Wylder & Corrie Westing,
TERFs Have No Place on The Left, SOCIALIST WORKER (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://socialistworker.org/2018/08/21/terfs-have-no-place-on-the-left.
106. A good example of this is a well-debated article where someone
espousing TERF beliefs insists that they are not a TERF in a popular feminist
space, Feminist Current. Penny White, Why I No Longer Hate ‘TERFs,’
FEMINIST
CURRENT
(Nov.
10,
2015),
https://www.feministcurrent
.com/2015/11/10/why-i-no-longer-hate-terfs/. The explanation of why this
article is in fact exclusionary is evident in the comments section which features
multiple criticisms of the article. Id.
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combined force can chip away at the pathological tropes of a
damaged country.
There is a tendency to think about law in a monumental
historical sense—Lawrence v. Texas107 and Obergefell v.
Hodges,108 or even Stonewall109 and Caitlyn Jenner.110 In the
context of queer rights, specifically transgender rights, this has
negative consequences.111 G.G. v. Gloucester County School
Board,112 as styled by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
represents precisely the danger of relying too much on a single
event, plaintiff, or idea because this case, set to be the first case
on transgender rights heard by the United States Supreme
Court, was remanded to the Fourth Circuit with a one-sentence
order vacating the judgment.113 Gavin Grimm (G.G.) proceeded
107. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
108. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
109. Jarrett Earnest, Does NYC’s ‘Gay Liberation’ Monument Whitewash
Stonewall? The New Museum Proposes Replacements., VULTURE (Nov. 28,
2018), https://www.vulture.com/2018/11/is-nycs-gay-liberation-monument-toowhite.html (discussing the ways in which “Gay Liberation,” the monument to
the Stonewall riots, might whitewash history); Garance Franke-Ruta, An
Amazing 1969 Account of the Stonewall Uprising, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/an-ama
zing-1969account-of-the-stonewall-uprising/272467/ (expressing the drawbacks of
putting too much faith in Stonewall).
110. See generally Joey DiGuglielmo, Caitlyn Jenner: American Hero or
‘Arrogant’ Dilettante?, WASH. BLADE (Aug. 19, 2015, 4:59 PM),
https://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/08/19/caitlyn-jenner-american-heroor-arrogant-dilettante/ (arguing that Caitlyn Jenner represents a problematic
transgender rights advocate at best); Marco Margaritoff, Caitlyn Jenner on
Backlash from LGBTQ Community: ‘I Get the Criticism That I Don’t Get It,’
COMPLEX (May 22, 2018), https://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2018/05/
caitlyn-jenner-backlash-lgbtq-community (discussing backlash against
Caitlyn Jenner for her problematic political views and public statements).
111. See generally Samantha Allen, Gavin Grimm Is Transgender: His
Legal Fight to Go to the Bathroom Is Endless, DAILY BEAST (May 24, 2018, 3:55
PM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/gavin-grimm-is-transgender-his-legalfight-to-go-to-the-bathroom-is-endless (describing the lengthy and complex
legal maneuvering of transgender rights in G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd.,
822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), as producing strain, confusion, frustration, and
other related emotions).
112. 822 F.3d 709.
113. Caitlin Emma, High Court Sidesteps Ruling on Transgender Rights,
POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2017, 3:53 PM), https://www.politico.com/story
/2017/03/supreme-court-scraps-transgender-bathroom-rights-235712.
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to graduate high school without ever resolving the legal issue his
case presented.114 Thus, those who eagerly tracked this case
were left with tremendous disappointment that the Supreme
Court failed to act on the important and divisive issue of
transgender rights.115 The impact of such inaction is not an
ephemeral understanding of fundamental rights, but rather the
physical danger posed to transgender persons who are denied
legal rights.116 That is, the denial should be understood
phenomenologically as a denial of the threat to one’s life, as
another attempt to end queer experience.
This monumental reading of history was dispelled by
Friedrich Nietzsche, and his critique remains relevant.117 There
are several problems with monumental approaches to history or
to narrative. The first is that it often ignores many of the
important people and actions that made an event possible. For
example, one might discuss slave revolts118 with reference to

114. G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, ACLU (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.aclu.org/cases/gg-v-gloucester-county-school-board.
115. Elliott Kozuch, BREAKING: U.S. Supreme Court Remands and
Vacates Gavin Grimm Case, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Mar. 6, 2017), https://
www.hrc.org/blog/breaking-united-states-supreme-court-remands-andvacates-gavin-grimm-case.
116. Id.
117. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE OF
HISTORY FOR LIFE 14–23 (Peter Preuss trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1874).
118. See generally Brian Gabrial, From Haiti to Nat Turner: Racial Panic
Discourse During the Nineteenth Century Partisan Press Era, 30 AM.
JOURNALISM 336 (2013) (discussing press coverage and racial panic discourse
surrounding slave revolts); see also JOHANNES POSTMA, SLAVE REVOLTS (2008)
(discussing slave revolts in encyclopedic fashion).
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Gabriel Prosser,119 Denmark Vesey,120 and Nat Turner,121 but
ignore Boston King.122 This flattens history and reduces our
interest in the complex narratives that shape social change. The
argument is not that we should reject discussing people and
events, but rather that we must tell a complete story. Telling
the story of queer people as a string of discrete events misses the
important everyday instances of queer politics. It is also
common to romantically remember these monuments as better
or more successful than they were. For example, one might
remember the team that won the World Series, even though that
team had worse statistics, won less games, and had less all-stars
than another year’s edition of that team or even another team
that year.
However, that sort of understanding fails to capture the
hammering work that led to change. It is synchronic, failing to
understand the long, multifaceted history of our historical
monuments. What we need is not the Badiouian evental

119. See generally DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, GABRIEL’S REBELLION: THE
VIRGINIA SLAVE CONSPIRACIES OF 1800 AND 1802 (1993); MICHAEL L. NICHOLLS,
WHISPERS OF REBELLION: NARRATING GABRIEL’S CONSPIRACY (2013); Douglas R.
Egerton, Gabriel’s Conspiracy and the Election of 1800, 56 J. SOUTHERN HIST.
191 (1990) (describing the impact Versey’s rebellion had ideologically and
politically).
120. See generally ETHAN J. KYTLE & BLAIN ROBERTS, DENMARK VESEY’S
GARDEN: SLAVERY AND MEMORY IN THE CRADLE OF THE CONFEDERACY (2018);
JOHN LOFTON, DENMARK VESEY’S REVOLT: THE SLAVE PLOT THAT LIT A FUSE TO
FORT SUMTER (John David Smith ed., Kent State Univ. Press 2013) (1983);
DAVID ROBERTSON, DENMARK VESEY: THE BURIED STORY OF AMERICA’S LARGEST
SLAVE REBELLION AND THE MAN WHO LED IT (2000).
121. See generally PATRICK H. BREEN, THE LAND SHALL BE DELUGED IN
BLOOD: A NEW HISTORY OF THE NAT TURNER REVOLT (2016); STEPHEN B. OATES,
THE FIRES OF JUBILEE: NAT TURNER’S FIERCE REBELLION (2014); NAT TURNER: A
SLAVE REBELLION IN HISTORY AND MEMORY (Kenneth Greenberg ed. 2004)
(discussing the broad significance of Nat Turner in his time through today’s
popular culture); Philip J. Schwarz, Gabriel’s Challenge: Slaves and Crime in
Late Eighteenth-Century Virginia, 90 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 283 (1982).
122. Boston King, Memoirs of the Life of Boston King, A Black Preacher,
METHODIST MAG., Mar.–June 1798, at 105; see also Adam Christian Smith,
Boston King (c. 1760-1802), BLACKPAST (Sept. 22, 2010), https://blackpast.org/
gah/boston-king-c-1760-1802; James W. St. G. Walker, King, Boston,
DICTIONARY CANADIAN BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio.php?id_nbr
=2489 (last visited Apr. 5, 2019).
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politics123 which, while helpful in assessing the significance of
discrete events, still has a tendency to deny the contextual
longue durée of evental politics. One need not do away with the
Event to resist the Event as historical lens. Reading the Event
and monumental history as similar will no doubt cause Badiou
and Nietzsche scholars to bristle, but the idea here is not to overdetermine the present.124 Indeed, it denies the work of
123. Andrew Robinson summarizes Badiou’s theory of the Event:
An Event is something akin to a rip in the fabric of being,
and/or of the social order. It is traumatic for the mainstream,
and exhilaratingly transformative for participants. Events
are so radical as to even escape Badiou’s own ontology. A lot
of Badiou’s discussions of the Event are negative. An Event
is depicted as being other than “being as being”, or the
normal, mathematically integrated structure of reality. Since
there is no general situation or History, something only has
‘being’ if it belongs to a situation. Events do not belong to
situations, events occur outside being-as-being. This means
that set theory and the resultant ontology cannot
conceptualise Events.
Andrew Robinson, Alain Badiou: The Event, CEASEFIRE: AN A TO Z OF THEORY
(Dec. 15, 2014, 11:13 PM), https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/alain-badiou-event/.
Robinson’s description gives conceptual clarity to Alain Badiou’s description:
“A truth is solely constituted by rupturing with the order which supports it,
never as an effect of that order. I have named this type of rupture which opens
up truths ‘the event.’” ALAIN BADIOU, BEING AND EVENT xii (Oliver Feltham
trans., 2007) (1988).
124. Although Badiou contrasts these two concepts, the fetishization of
the Event pushes it toward its monumental specter.
ALAIN BADIOU,
METAPOLITICS 97 (Jason Barker trans., Verso 2005) (1998). Yet, David Wild
writes in a way suggesting the two ideas are more similar than even Wild lets
on:
Thus, Badiou’s first move is to divide history: on the one
hand, there is the monumental history of the state (of the
victors); on the other, there are the rare, often brief, instances
of politics that are connected to the truth of the collective . . .
. While all political sequences are necessarily “singular”, in
as much as they trace no destiny (there is no determinism in
the aleatory trajectory of a political event), the task of
philosophy is to extract the “infinite” aspects of political
sequences from the relativizing effects of “statist” history.
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hammering.125 In this sense then, it is important not to stop
hammering, not to lay down one’s hammer.
One will always be dissatisfied if one only measures
progress by Supreme Court decisions.126 The legal system is
built that way, to be slow and theoretically well-reasoned. It is

David Wild, Alain Badiou’s Politics and the Problem of Social History, 10
CRITICAL HORIZONS: J. PHIL. 391, 397 (2009).
125. Sara Ahmed describes the complexity of hammering and the need to
constantly practice and refine hammering:
Stones might be willing; or not. At one level, stones
appear as willful, insofar as willfulness is often related to
being obstinate and unyielding. But of course its hardness,
its tendencies, allows us to do certain things. We might
assume the stone as a willing participant if we use the stone
as a hammer: our hammering might depend on the stone; our
will might be distributed across a field of action that includes
the stone. But we should not find agency only in agreement.
That is an-all-too human tendency that I have been grappling
with throughout this book: to assume “yes” as a sign of being
willing, a sign that is taken up as the giving of permission to
proceed. This is one way we tend to go wrong. It is not that
from the point of view of the hammer, everything is nail, but
that the hammer is already a human point of view. The
hammer is stone given the form of human intention. Perhaps
stones are willing inasmuch as what they do not let us do; in
how they resist our intentions. They can be checking powers;
reminders that the world is not waiting to receive our shape.
Perhaps then, they grab our attention. We might need to lose
the hammer to find the stone.
Sara Ahmed, Willful Stones, FEMINISTKILLJOYS (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://feministkilljoys.com/2016/01/29/willful-stones/.
126. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Ideological Preferences and Hollow Hopes:
Responding to Criticism, UNIV. CHI. PRESS, https://www.press.uchicago
.edu/books/rosenberg/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2019); see also Douglas
NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 877, 901 (2013). See generally Scott L. Cummings, Empirical Studies of
Law and Social Change: What Is the Field? What Are the Questions?, 2013
WISC. L. REV. 171 (2013) (providing a framework for analysis of the courts’
ability to address and affect social change). But see Adam Deming, Comment:
Backlash Blunders: Obergefell and the Efficacy of Litigation to Achieve Social
Change, 19 J. CONST. L. 271 (2016) (arguing that backlash to Supreme Court
decisions is possible, but that the Obergefell decision was not subject to
significant backlash).
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plodding, it makes gradual changes, and it moves at “all
deliberate speed.”127 This deliberate system makes the legal
system predictable and allows people to reasonably assess the
likelihood they will prevail in a case,128 but it does not
necessarily assure that rights are distributed evenly and
defended vigorously.129 That is why the real work of law is at
the body. Our bodies grow weary as we wait for law, as if law
had a cape and a utility belt.130 So rather than waiting, Ahmed
127. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); see DERRICK BELL,
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 112 (1987).
128. Jeremy Waldron makes this argument in the context of stare decisis:
There is a cluster of considerations commonly cited in
support of the system of precedent that seems to invoke ruleof-law values. These include the importance of certainty,
predictability, and respect for established expectations. By
commanding that judges follow previous decisions, stare
decisis is supposed to make it easier for people facing a new
situation to predict how the courts will deal with it: they will
deal with it in the way that they have dealt with similar
situations in the past, rather than striking out unpredictably
with a new approach of their own.
Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2012).
129. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Problem with Predictability, AM.
PROSPECT (July 7, 2005), https://prospect.org/article/problem-predictability
(describing how predictability in law and a justice’s rulings does not
necessarily produce the best decisions).
130. This is a reference to the DC Comics character Batman who wears
a cape and a utility belt where he stores various gadgets to fight evil. The idea
of “waiting for Batman” has come to represent the idea of waiting for a
superhero to come along and right wrongs or solve problems, often
characterizing the people waiting as hopeful, idealistic, and perhaps out of
touch with political and social realities. See JAMES KAKALIOS, THE PHYSICS OF
THE SUPERHEROES 159 (2005) (describing Batman’s utility belt, and other
attributes of comic book heroes, as a way to discuss topics in physics). See
generally Spencer Ackerman, Batman Confronts Police Racism in Latest Comic
Book, GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2015, 10:31 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/books/2015/sep/15/batman-confronts-police-brutality-in-latest-comicbook (discussing Batman as a politico-legal commentary on police violence);
Matt Sturtevant, Waiting for Batman, FIRST BAPTIST LAWRENCE (June 4, 2017),
https://firstbaptistlawrence.com/waiting-for-batman/ (using “waiting for
Batman” as a message to encourage salvation and reconceptualizing one’s
relationship with self and Christianity); Patrik Walker, Rookie CB Duke
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would have us pick up our hammers.
It is hammering every day to make a less exclusionary, less
transphobic, less homophobic world that appreciates the
intrinsic value of the body. Until we do that, and slavery proves
this in its disregard for the Black body, we will struggle because
absent an appreciation for the body, what it does, does not do,
and what it enables and prevents, then a meaningful queer
theory in law will be difficult.
Conclusion
What I have argued is that we must come back to the body
as a site of law. From the prison bed to health care laws, we
experience law bodily. A critical theory of orientation asks us to
focus on the body and the ways in which it interacts with law
such that when we engage in its prepositional logic we
understand exactly what that means about our relationship to
it. Law without the body comes dangerously close to the erasure
of bodies in monarchical politics highlighted by Ernst
Kantorowicz’s 1997 book, The King’s Two Bodies.131
Kantorowicz troubled over the ways in which monarchs
fabulated a body that existed beyond death.132 This political
Thomas a Dark Horse to Make Cowboys’ Final Roster, 247SPORTS (Aug. 21,
2017), https://247sports.com/nfl/dallas-cowboys/Bolt/Rookie-CB-Duke-Thomas
-a-dark-horse-to-make-Dallas-Cowboys-final-roster-106358501/
(describing
“waiting for Batman” as a sort of hopelessness felt for, and called by, a veteran
athlete hoping to take a more prominent role in the upcoming season).
131. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1997).
132. Perhaps most revealing of the grammar of Kantorowicz’s theory,
Alain Boureau summarizes it as such:
This organized grammar took on a more specific, more
‘Western’ aspect in Ernst Kantorowicz’s version. For him,
political transcendence constituted a true discourse in
Western Europe, which gave birth to an idea of statehood
that has scarcely any cultural equivalent. To fully grasp this
trend, it is necessary to start from the central principle
underlying the concept of The King’s Two Bodies: ‘dignitas
non moritur’ [dignity does not die]. This formula undeniably
contains an element of the metaphorical, with a literal term
(dignity, function) and a figurative term (represented by the
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arrangement denied the body so much so that an absent body
began to control the physical body of others in the Middle Ages.
It is concerning that if we ignore the body we will have a political
structure built on the body’s absence,133 which may be an
accurate description of our current political system. The body’s
absence brings to mind Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection. 134
For Kristeva, abjection was the state of being utterly annihilated
in a sort of noncorporeal position.135 One might think of the body
verb to die). Bearing in mind that the metaphorical process
basically turns on the predicate, what we have here is a wellworn metaphor: in the fourteenth century Lucas of Penna
glossed ‘does not die’ as ‘lasts forever’ [quod semper est]. The
statement seems commonplace, extending to the secular
institution a principle established in the domain of religion:
the Church, the Apostolic See, does not die.
Hence,
institutional history indicates a displacement, a shift.
Kantorowicz’s brilliant idea was to reveal a new metaphor by
placing the emphasis on the subject and not on the predicate.
If dignity does not die, that is because it is compared to a
living being, a person. The predicate non moritur thus
creates a paradigm of living, immortal subjects that combines
institutions (dead metaphors), divine subjects (theological
predications) and mythological beings (allegories) or fictional
ones (living metaphors): Empire, Mystical Body, Angel,
Christ, Treasury, King, Phoenix.
Alain Boureau, How Christian Was the Sacralization of Monarchy in Western
Europe (Twelfth-Fifteenth Centuries)?, in MYSTIFYING THE MONARCH: STUDIES
ON DISCOURSE, POWER, AND HISTORY 25, 27 (Jeroen Deploige & Gita Deneckere
eds., 2006) (citation omitted).
133. See generally DREW LEDER, THE ABSENT BODY (1990) (discussing the
absence of the body in political discourse and arguing for a phenomenological
rejoinder).
134. See generally JULIA KRISTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON
ABJECTION (Leon S. Roudiez trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1982) (1980)
(discussing Kristeva’s theory of abjection).
135. Kristeva describes the abject in this way:
When I am beset by abjection, the twisted braid of affects
and thoughts I call by such a name does not have, properly
speaking, a definable object. The abject is not an ob-ject
facing me, which I name or imagine. Nor is it an ob-jest, an
otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a systematic quest of desire.
What is abject is not my correlative, which, providing me with
someone or something else as support, would allow me to be
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of the slave that was denied; for rather than accept slaves as
corporeal entities, the United States understood slaves as
objects, not subjects.136 This made sense in the perverse logic of
capitalist white supremacy137 because it was far easier to dispose
of objects than bodies. Bodies are messy—they sweat, demand
care, leak, break, secrete, defecate, and rot.138 Who would want
more or less detached and autonomous. The abject has only
one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I. If the
object, however, through its opposition, settles me within the
fragile texture of a desire for meaning, which, as a matter of
fact, makes me ceaselessly and infinitely homologous to it,
what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is
radically excluded and draws me toward the place where
meaning collapses. A certain “ego” that merged with its
master, a superego, has flatly driven it away. It lies outside,
beyond the set, and does not seem to agree to the latter’s rules
of the game. And yet, from its place of banishment, the abject
does not cease challenging its master.
Id. at 1–2.
136. The slave’s existence as object was foundational to the United States’
slave system, enabling the entire enterprise:
The slave is objectified in such a way that they are legally
made an object (a commodity) to be used and exchanged. It is
not just their labor-power that is commodified—as with the
worker—but their very being. As such, they are not
recognized as a social subject and are thus precluded from the
category of “human”—inclusion in humanity being
predicated on social recognition, volition, subjecthood, and
the valuation of life.
Editors’ Introduction to AFRO-PESSIMISM: AN INTRODUCTION 8 (Racked &
Dispatched, eds., 2017); SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR,
SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 62 (1997) (“The
slave is the object or the ground that makes possible the existence of the
bourgeois subject and, by negation or contradistinction, defines liberty,
citizenship, and the enclosures of the social body.”); Lynn Stewart, Louisiana
Subjects: Power, Space and the Slave Body, 2 ECUMENE 227, 227 (1995) (“The
slave body was crucial to slave-owners as a unit of labour, a vector of disease,
an object of desire, and, always, as a locus of potentially violent resistance.”).
See generally PAGE DUBOIS, SLAVES AND OTHER OBJECTS (2003) (discussing the
slave as object in Ancient Greece).
137. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707,
1714 (1993).
138. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, LIBIDINAL ECONOMY 1–3 (1993); Anke
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to deal with them? The object, thus, has no body.
A queer phenomenology takes this on directly and with the
verve necessary to establish the centrality of queer bodies in law.
Queer bodies are even messier,139 but not in the transphobic and
homophobic ways that various segments of the population
demonize queer sexual relations and other interactions. 140
Aimee Carrillo Rowe and Francesca T. Royster describe
queerness as “the messy affects of political living,” which resist
normative scripts of appropriate appearance, action, sexuality,
gender, and political engagement.141 Queer phenomenology
appreciates the messiness of bodies.
Messiness is a condition of possibility.142 Queering space
means resisting the formal language of bodies. It is a ruthless
reclaiming of the power of bodies to articulate identities. The
way to rescue the queer body’s push toward non-being, toward
abjection, is to become that much more concerned with the body

Bernau, Bodies of Knowledge, 25 FLORILEGIUM 75, 79–82 (2008); Imogen Tyler,
Against Abjection, 10 FEMINIST THEORY 77, 79–80 (2009) (“Kristeva theorises
abjection in distinctly phenomenological terms, associating the abject with all
that is repulsive and fascinating about bodies and, in particular, those aspects
of bodily experience which unsettle singular bodily integrity: death, decay,
fluids, orifices, sex, defecation, vomiting, illness, menstruation, pregnancy and
childbirth”).
139. Deborah R. Vargas, Ruminations on Lo Sucio as a Latino Queer
Analytic, 66 AM. Q. 715, 718, 724 (2014).
140. Martin F. Manalansan IV, The Messy Itineraries of Queerness, SOC.
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, (July 21, 2015), https://culanth.org/fieldsights/themessy-itineraries-of-queerness.
141.
Aimee Carrillo Rowe & Francesca T. Royster, Loving
Transgressions: Queer of Color Bodies, Affective Ties, Transformative
Community, 21 J. LESBIAN STUDS. 243, 245 (2016).
142. Martin F. Manalansan IV describes the messiness of queer bodies
this way:
Queer as mess refers to material and affective conditions
of impossible subjects as well as an analytical stance that
negates, deflects, if not resists the “cleaning up” function of
the normative. Queerness, then, is not just about off-kilter
sex or nonnormative desires, but is about the potentials and
possibilities behind quotidian practices and struggles of
peripheral lives.
Manalansan, supra note 140.
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and exhibit the necessary ethic of care143 to accept and advocate
for queer bodies. Queer phenomenology should be messy
because only in the messiness of ontological appreciation will
queer people be able to exist in law.
This should be a goal of a just legal theory and a just legal
system.

143. Rather than the essentialist notion promoted by Carol Gilligan, I
take to heart Malan & Cilliers reframing of Gilligan’s ethic of care as
“concerned with humane, non-violative relationships between human beings.”
Yvonne Malan & Paul Cilliers, Gilligan and Complexity: Reinterpreting the
“Ethic of Care”, 36 ACTA ACADEMIA, no. 3, 2004, at 1, 17. This in turn means
“that considering the relationships between people and the context in which
they find themselves are as important as the abstract rights and principles at
stake.” Id. at 16. That is, a phenomenological theory of queerness values
people in time and space as opposed to abstraction and universalism.
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